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This article examines the evolution of retirement in Brazil and its old-age support programs 
(public pension). The key objective is to show that given the current trend in population and size of the 
programs, their sustainability in the near future may be endangered. In this paper, we also provide a 
measure of public pension expenditure under different policy scenarios. This paper provides empirical 
evidence  indicating  that  the  absence  of  appropriate  policies  can  aggravate  adverse  effects  of 
population aging. We show that the public pension system works less efficiently than desired and that 
it is already in a weaker condition than systems in more developed nations. We contribute to the debate 
on how critical policy areas may reduce the potential economic impact of demographic changes. 
 





Esse artigo examine a evolução da aposentadoria no Brasil e os seus principais programas de 
apoio aos idosos, especificamente o sistema público de aposentadoria. O objetivo central do trabalho é 
mostrar como a evolução da dinâmica demográfica no Brasil e a atual estrutura dos programas de 
apoio ao idoso, a sustentabilidade dos mesmos no futuro pode ser limitada. O artigo mostra evidências 
empíricas indicando que a ausência de políticas públicas adequadas pode ampliar os impactos dos 
efeitos  do  envelhecimento  populacional.  O  artigo  mostra  que  o  sistema  pública  de  previdência 
funciona de maneira menos eficiente do que o desejado e já se encontra em uma situação compatível a 
de países em estágios mais avançados do envelhecimento populacional.  
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  The world population has been showing signs of major changes in the past few decades. The 
average age of the population is projected to 45 years by 2050 in developed countries, according to the 
United Nations. The aging in the developing countries has been slower so far, and the average age by 
2050 will be 36 years old, but given the fast decline in fertility and mortality, the aging process will be 
faster than observed in the developed countries.  
  The aging of the population increased the concern in relation to the sustainability of the public 
social support programs for the elderly (Wise, 2004). If in the past a large part of the support for the 
elderly was provided by the family, today this support comes from programs created by the public 
sector and, in some countries, also by the private sector (Costa, 1998). In general, these programs are 
very important in order to narrow the difference in income between the elderly and people at an active 
age  and  to  reduce  the  poverty  rates  of  the  elderly  population  (Gruber  &  Wise,  2001).  However, 
recently the vast majority of programs have come up against serious fiscal and financial problems. 
Most of them function on the Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) basis, namely, the benefits of today's elderly is 
financed by current  workers’ contributions. The balance of the programs is increasingly difficult with 
the increase in the ratio of dependence, population aging and a faster process of reducing the average 
retirement age (Bongaarts, 2004; ).  
Brazil  is  one  of  the  countries  facing  such  problems.  Despite  unabated  interest  among 
researchers in issues pertaining to the impacts of social security provision to retirement behavior in 
developed countries (Gruber and Wise, 1988; 2004; 2008; Wise, 2010), little is known about these 
issues  in  emerging  economies  (Carvalho-Filho,  2010; Soares,  2010). Brazil  is  one  example  of  an 
important context for elaborating linkages between pension benefits provision and retirement behavior. 
The rapidly aging population presents one of the greatest public policy challenges in Brazil. Compared 
to other emerging economies, Brazil is distinct for combining a relatively large public sector with 
rapidly aging population and declining labor force participation at older ages (Queiroz, 2008; Turra, 
Holz and Cotlear, 2011).  The percentage of individuals age 65 and over is estimated to be 20% in 
2050, compared to 3% in 1970 (UN, 2010). These changes in population age structure may impose 
severe pressures on the public sector (Bongaarts, 2004; Miller, Mason and Holz, 2011). At the same 
time, the length of working life has fallen over time, which results from both increases in educational 
attainment  (younger  workers)  and  changes  in  retirement  behavior  (older  workers).  The  fall  in 
economic participation for older workers (65 and older) is striking: 30% of them were in the labor 
force in 2000 compared to 60% in 1970. In 2005, social security benefits and other forms of elder 
support represented about 14% of the GDP (Araujo, Turra and Queiroz, 2010) and are expected to be 
the fastest growing component of public spending (Giambiagi & Além, 1997; Giambiagi & Castro, 
2003; Soares, 2010). 
  This article examines the the impacts of population aging, labor force participation on the 
public  pension program  in  Brazil.  .  The  key  objective  is  to show that  given  the  current  trend  in 
population and size of the programs, their sustainability in the near future may be endangered.  The 
analysis  follows  previous  studies,  specially    Turra  andQueiroz  (2009),  that  projected  the  ratio  of 
dependence of the public pension in different scenarios and show how the combination of change in Population Aging and the Rising Costs of Public Pension in Brazil – CEDEPLAR/UFMG – TD 438(2011) 
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the age structure and absence of proper policies make the situation of the Brazilian situation worse 
than could be expected. In this paper, we also provide a measure of public pension expenditure under 
different policy scenarios. The analysis considers only first order effects, we do not  investigate feed-
back effects and other direct and indirect impacts of social security changes.   
This paper provides empirical evidence indicating that the absence of appropriate policies can,  
aggravate adverse effects of population aging. We show that the public pension system workers less 
efficiently than desired and it is already in  weaker condition than system in more developed nations.  
We contribute to the debate on how critical policy areas may reduce the potential economic impact of 
demographic changes. We do not test for the effects of social security financial conditions to economic 
growth,  but  by  using  counterfactual  projections of  different  measures    we shed  light  on  the roles 
played by demographic, policy and economic changes on the situation of the social protection system 
for the elderly in Brazil.   
 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE BRAZILIAN ELDERLY SUPPORT SYSTEM 
   
This section presents an overview of the social support system for the elderly in Brazil. The 
paper presents a overview of the contributory, both for urban and rural workers, and non-contributory 
programs. Most pension systems are based on the PAYGO schemes, with a means-tested eligibility. 
The pension system is divided in four segments: general system, civil servants system, state-level civil 
servants and private fully-funded capitalization system. The general system covers workers employed 
in the private sector. There is also a large non-contributory welfare program for the elderly and disable. 
The focus here is on the public pension system for workers in the private sector, called Regime Geral 
da Previdência Social.  
  The Lei Eloi Chaves, a legislation, was approved in 1923 to regulate social security for both 
civil servants and private workers (general system). This law decentralized the pension system, as each 
company was responsible for its own employees. The first reform happened in 1933 when the pension 
funds  became  structured  by  professional  category  (Leite  1983).  The  general  pension  system  was 
centralized only in 1966, when the House of Representatives approved the Social Security Ordinary 
Law.  The  National  Social  Security  Administration,  INPS,  incorporated  all  the  revenues  and 
expenditures from sector-specific programs as well as its assets and liabilities. Another major change 
during this time was in the scheme of the program, which changed from a capitalization system to a 
PAYGO (Leite 1983).  
The last major reform happened with the 1988 Constitution, which extended mandatory social 
security  coverage  to  most  of  the  excluded  groups,  including  rural  workers,  without  requiring 
equivalent increases in revenues from contributions. Other measures made the system more generous 
than before: establishing the minimum wage as the lowest benefit paid by the system, indexing all 
pensions to the minimum wage, and reducing the minimum age of retirement (Stephanes 1998). 
Until 1998, full pension benefits were granted to all workers who have contributed for 10 
years to the system, have reached normal retirement age (65 for men and 60 for women - Old-Age 
Pension Benefit), or could prove that they have been working for a certain number of years (35 for Population Aging and the Rising Costs of Public Pension in Brazil – CEDEPLAR/UFMG – TD 438(2011) 
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men and 30 for women, but without requirement of contribution over that time - Length of Service 
Pension Benefit). In addition, special retirement schemes existed that granted proportional retirement 
benefits for individuals who had worked for 30 and 25 years, for men and women respectively. The 
benefits were computed based on the last 36 months of activity (Brasil, 2002).  
In  1998,  an  important  reform  was  approved  in  order  to  help  solve  the  program’s  fiscal 
imbalance. The main change was the introduction of a new methodology to calculate pension benefits 
based on an actuarial rule. The new benefit computation is based on the Swedish Notional Defined 
Benefit  Program  and  takes  into  account  longer  earnings  history,  the  life  expectancy  at  age  of 
retirement, and a coefficient that creates disincentives to early retirement. A minimum retirement age 
has not yet been approved for workers in the private sector (Brasil, 2002). 
 
 
3. EVOLUTION OF THE BRAZILIAN SYSTEM: CONTRIBUTION AND BENEFICIARIES 
   
The general system  was  conceived when rapid population growth and low life expectancy 
combined  to  sustain  the  program.    Recent  decades,  however,  observed  a  decline  in  the  ratio 
workers/retirees, the ratio was 30:1 in 1940, declined to 5:1 in the sixties, was 1.7:1 in 2000. In 2000, 
the PAYGO system had 27 million workers contributing and paid benefits to 16 million pensioners. 
Including all types of programs in 2000 the social security system paid more than 21 million benefits. 
In 2008, last available figures from the Brazilian Social Security Administration, show that on average 
there were about 40 million workers contributing to the system and 23 million beneficiaries.  
  Figure  1  shows  a  time-series  of  the  number  of  people  paying  social  security  taxes  and 
receiving benefits, based on projections and PNAD data. The fastest increase in the coverage of the 
social security system occurred after 1970, that is, after the centralization of the program under the 
supervision of the federal government. From 1970 on, several categories of workers who were not 
covered by the system became eligible to it, including self-employed and rural workers. The number 
of total pension doubled since 1990 due to population aging and, mostly, by the extension of coverage 
and generosity of the system. Turra & Queiroz (2009) simulate the impacts of the rules and regulations 
of the system in the support ratio of the program. They argued that in addition to population changes, 
flexible retirement rules rose rapidly the number of beneficiaries. The increase in the coverage of the 
program is impressive, however part of the labor force is still not covered. Figure 1 shows that about 
45% of the labor force does not  contribute social security taxes; however most of them  could be 
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FIGURE 1 
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  The system has been expanding fast since 1970, the ratio of pensions per population aged 60 
and over from 19% in 1970 to 77% in 1999, according to the Social Security Administration. Figure 2 
displays the percentage of population receiving any sort of social security benefit, as reported by the 
population  census.  It  is  possible  to  identify  only  those  receiving retirement  benefit  and  survivor's 
pension benefit. It is not possible to identify any other sort of benefit received by the individuals using 
census data. Two points are worth mentioning from Figure 2. First, the early age at which benefits are 
being received, about 10% of the population aged 45 years is already receiving some sort of benefit. 
Second, although the coverage has improved over time the system is not yet universal, and about 20% 
of the population aged 70 and over are not receiving any sort of social security benefit.  Figure 3 
shows the percentage of the labor force that contributes to social security, based on census data, for 
both sexes. The results indicate that about half of the labor force contributes to the system across all 
age groups. The coverage has been showing some signs of improvement in recent years, we discuss 
that better below, but there is still a large fraction of the labor force that is not covered by the social 
programs in Brazil while they are working, but could qualify for non-contributory programs as they 
reach older ages.   
  Ansileiro & Paiva (2008) show that the percentage of registered private sector workers, those 
who contribute to the public pension system, is very low in Brazil. They estimated that in the 1990s 
the  rate  was  around  29%  of  the  employed  population,  reaching  a  32%  in  2006.  There  are  also 
important differences in the contribution rates between males and females. The rates for females are 
lower, although showing an upward trend, at about 25% of total employed workers, whereas male 
contribution rates is about 35% of total employed male workers. 
  Queiroz (2008) and Turra & Queiroz (2009) estimated the contribution and beneficiary rates 
for males and females, by age,  from the PNAD household survey. The results, depicted in Figure 4, 
shows the differences in male and female rates, and how the rates vary by age. Interesting to note, that Population Aging and the Rising Costs of Public Pension in Brazil – CEDEPLAR/UFMG – TD 438(2011) 
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they  are  very  similar  in  shape  but  very  different  in  level.  Also,  it  should  be  noted  that  a  large 
percentage  of  females  receive  survival  benefit  pension.  The  system  has  been  characterized  by 
generous benefits and low contribution rates. About 77 per cent of the population aged 60 and older 
received some sort of pension benefits by 2002. On one hand, beneficiary rates have increased for all 
age groups. At age 50, for example, about 20 per cent of the population received benefits in 2002 
compared to 17 per cent in the early 1980s. At the same time, contribution rates have declined for both 
men and women. Among men, only 50 per cent of those in the labour market had made contributions 
in  2002  compared  to  65  per  cent  twenty  years  earlier. These  results  also  generally  hold  true  for 
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  The combination of elements discussed before lead to a high public expenditure in Brazil in 
comparison  to  more  developed  economies.  Figure  3  shows  the  relation  between  social  security 
expenditures  (as  %  of  GDP)  and  traditional demographic  dependency  ratio.  Public expenditure  in 
Brazil is as high as expenditures observed in some OECD countries, but in Brazil dependency ratio is 
much  lower.  For  example,  compare  to  countries  with  the  same  old-age  dependency  ratio,  social 
security  expenditures  in  Brazil  are  from  8  to  2  times  greater.  In  several  regions  of  the  world, 
populations with  older age structures have  lower  labor  force  participation  rates for  older  persons.  
Clark et al (1999) and Profeta (2002) argued that older populations have already create an universal 
system of old-age security and are, in general, more developed and wealthier. The combination of 
these elements lead to early retirement and lower labor force participation at older ages. The relation 
between these variables is less known in Latin America and Brazil (Carvalho-Filho, 2008; Queiroz, 
2008). The following section tries to shed some light on this matter for Brazil.  Population Aging and the Rising Costs of Public Pension in Brazil – CEDEPLAR/UFMG – TD 438(2011) 
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FIGURE 3 
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4. AGE PROFILES OF LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION  
 
4.1. Age Profiles of Labor Force Participation 
   
The trend in labor force participation for Brazilian male workers shows significant changes in 
the last decades (Figure 4). It is clear that the length of working life shrank over time. Labor force 
participation  rates  of  young  individuals  have  declined  because  of  the  increase  in  educational 
attainment. Based on census data it is calculated that 95% of the population aged 10-14 years was in 
school in 2000 compared to 54% in 1960. The rates have also declined for older workers. In 1950 
almost 90% of the population aged sixty to sixty-four years was in the labor force, and this number has 
declined to 65% in 2000. The same rate of decline is observed for younger old workers. The fall in 
economic participation is even greater for older workers, those above sixty-five years of age: 30% of 
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FIGURE 4 
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The female labor force participation rate shows a completely different trend in the same period 
(Figure 5). The main change in female labor force participation is the rapid increase in the economic 
activity of females in their prime-age; those aged 20 to 60 years. Durand (1975) suggested a U-shaped 
pattern between female labor force participation and economic development, and the Brazilian case 
seems to fit this pattern. Durand (1975) and Mammem & Paxson (2000) studied this pattern in several 
countries,  finding  a  similar  relation  between  economic  development  and  female  labor  force 
participation. At  youngest  and  oldest  ages,  female  labor  force stays  stable  over  the  fifty  years of 
analysis. For women aged fifty to sixty year labor force participation is much higher in 1990 and 2000 
than it was in any preceding years. 
 
 Population Aging and the Rising Costs of Public Pension in Brazil – CEDEPLAR/UFMG – TD 438(2011) 
13 
FIGURE 5 























It  is  also  interesting  to  investigate  whether  labor  force  participation  varies  for  different 
socioeconomic groups in Brazil. The previous section showed that some groups of the population ahed 
earlier access to pension benefits what could affect that working decisions. However, it is observed 
that labor  force participation rates  fell  for  workers  of  different socioeconomic backgrounds.  It is 
possible  to  use  years  of  schooling  as  a  proxy  for  socioeconomic  status  (SES)  and  estimate 
participation rates using census data from 1960 to 2000 by four different levels of education: 0 to 4, 5 
to 8, 9 to 11 and 12 and more years of schooling. This measure is highly correlated with the general 
socioeconomic  status  of  the  individual  and is preferred  to  other  measures of  SES  (e.g.  wealth or 
income) in this study since it offers better comparability among age groups.  
The trend reflects the increase in the coverage of the social security system in the country, a 
move away from agriculture work and increase levels of income of the older population in the past 
half-century. In 2000, participation rates for workers aged 60 to 64 and 65 to 69, for all SES groups, 
intercept at the same levels around 50% and 40%, respectively. For older workers, those above age 70, 
the rates converge at lower levels around 20%. There is also a decline in the participation rates for all 
SES groups, but steeper for the oldest age group (65-69). The decline is also steeper for low SES, 
which might be explained by the universalization of social security benefits in the 1990s. High SES 
workers have lower participation rates at all times, but their decline over time is slower than that of 
low  SES.  From  1960  to  2000,  the  participation  rates  of  workers  age  65-69  years  declined  33 
percentage points for low SES workers, and 20 percentage points for high SES workers. These trends 
seem to reflect the increase in coverage of social security system in the country, a move away from 
agriculture work and increase levels of income of older population in the past half-century.  
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5. SIMULATING THE COSTS OF PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEM IN BRAZIL 
 
5.1. Estimating the Costs of Public Pension in Brazil 
 
  This section follows the methodology proposed by Bongaarts (2004) to investigate the the 
welfare system in Brazil. In a previous work,  Turra & Queiroz (2009) use counterfactual projections 
of the social security support ratios to shed light on the roles played by  demographic, policy and 
economic changes on social security problems and, in turn, on potential limits for the demographic 
dividends. The authors projected the ratio of dependence of the Brazilian system in different scenarios 
and show how the combination of change in the age structure and absence of proper policies make the 
situation  of  the  Brazilian  situation  worse  than  could  be  expected.    This  paper  contributes  to  the 
analysis  including the  financial  dimension by  projecting  pension  expenditures  in  relation  to  total 
earnings under different scenarios, uses a more recent population projection, and consideres different 
scenarios of labor market participation and formalization.  
 
5.1.1. Social Security Expenditure Measures 
 
  Bongaarts (2004) and Rocha & Caetano (2007) argued that the old-age dependency ratio (the 
ratio between population aged 65 and above to the population age 15 to 64 - ODR) is not a good 
measure of the burden of public pension systems. The are two main reasons for that: a) first, people 
retire before they reach age 65, as we discussed before; and  b) the number of individuals contributing 
to the pension system is much smaller that the labor force in several countries, especially in Brazil 
where we observed a large informal labor market.  
  The first measure of interest, proposed by Bongaarts (2004), is the ratio of pensioners per 
population aged 65 and above. This measure is called pensioner ratio (PR). This ratio can be greater 
than 1  because  individuals retire before  age  65. As we  show  before,  this  is  very  common  in the 
Brazilian case. The second measure is the Employment Ratio (ER) which relates number of employees 
making pension contributions to the population aged 15-64 (in the labor force). ER is normally higher 
for males than for females, as it was shown in previous sections.   
  Bongaarts  (2004)  proposed  the  use  of  a  more  accurate  measure  to  relate  the  weight  of 
pensioners in an economy: the ratio of pensioners to workers (PWR). The PWR is directed related to 
the old-age dependency ratio and the pensioner ratio (number of pensioners to the population aged 65 
and above), and it is indirectly related to the employment ratio (ratio of workers making contributions 
to the population aged 15 to 64).  The data for population in Brazil were obtained from the National 
Statistics Office (IBGE). The data from pensioners and contributors were obtained from the Ministério 
da Previdência Social (MPAS). We considered only the benefits that were considered active by MPAS 
and contributions made by individuals. 
  The  public  pension  level  of  benefit (replacement  rate) is given  by  the  relation  of  pension 
benefit to labor income. Benefit Ratio (BR) is calculated as the ratio of average public pension by the 
average earnings. In a PAYGO system, like the Brazilian one, the contribution rate should be close to 
the  relation  between  total  spending  and  total  earnings,  which  will  be  discussed  in  the  following 
paragraph.    Population Aging and the Rising Costs of Public Pension in Brazil – CEDEPLAR/UFMG – TD 438(2011) 
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  Bongaarts (2004) suggested that the level of public expenditure on public pension should be 
calculated as the total annual spending on public pension divided by the total earnings of workers 
(PER).  The  annual  spending  included  old-age  public  pensions,  length  of  contribution  retirement 
pensions,  survivor   and  disability  benefits.   Current  total  earnings  were  obtained from  the MPAS 
database and included total wages received over the year (pre-tax) for workers making contributions to 
the system.  
   Table 4 presents the calculated measures for Brazil and the results produced by Bongaarts 
(2004) for the most developed economies in the world. The estimates show that old age dependency 
 ratio (ODR) in Brazil is much lower than for G-7 economies. ODR, in developed economies, range 
from 0.19 in the United States to 0.27 in Italy. The ratio in Italy means that there are 27 elderly for 100 
people between ages 15 and 64. The ratio in Brazil is much lower (0.11) because the country is in an 
earlier stage of the demographic transition.  
  Employment Ratio (ER) in Brazil sits at the bottom of the distribution. There are 34 workers 
making  contributions to the pension system  for  every 100 people in the labor force. The  measure 
indicates the high level of informality in the Brazilian labor market, which is directly related to poor 
labor conditions. The ER ranges from 0.55 in Italy to 0.76 in the United States. It is interesting to note, 
however,  that  the  Pensioner  Ratio  (PR)  is  the  highest  when  compared  to  the  more  developed 
economies. For the G-7 countries, the PR ranges from 1.10 in the US to 1.47 in Italy. In Brazil, a 
country with much lower ODR, the number of pensioners per elderly is 1.67.  
  The three measures presented before lead to the estimation of the Pensioner per Worker Ratio 
(PWR).  This  measure  is  a  much  better  and  more  accurate  indicator  of  public  pension  systems 
sustainability and it is a better measure of the demographic burden to the system. The main objective 
of the paper is to show the impact of population changes to the social security system in Brazil. If one 
compares  the  Old-Age  Dependency  Ratio  in  Brazil  it  would  be  reasonable  to  consider  that  the 
situation of the public pension system in Brazil is relatively stable, since there is a large number of 
working-age population to elderly population. However, the actual situation of the system could be 
considered worse since a large number of working age population are not making contributions to the 
system, and people retire at earlier ages. PWR is much larger than the usual old-age dependency ratio 
for all countries, ranging from 0.27 in the United States to 0.71 in Italy. PWR in Brazil is affected by 
the high level of informality in the labor market, early retirement ages, and generosity of the public 
pension system.  
  Lastly, the paper compares the level of pension expenditures (PER) and benefit levels (BR) in 
Brazil to more developed economies.  Table 4 shows that average benefits in Brazil are more generous, 
in relation to wages, than in any other country studied by Bongaarts (2004).  The average benefit in 
Brazil is about 70% of the average labor income. . This measure considers the ratio between average 
benefits of  all  retirees  to average  wage  for  all  workers,.  It  should  be noted  that  there  is  a lot  of 
variation  depending  on  the  type  of  benefit.  For  example,  benefit  replacement  level  for  old-age 
retirement  (obtained for males aged 65 and females age 60) is about 46% of current wages, whereas 
replacement  rates for  length  of  contribution  retirement  is  1.46  times  the average labor  income  of 
contributors. Public Expenditure Ratios (PER) gives the level of expenditure to current wages. PER Population Aging and the Rising Costs of Public Pension in Brazil – CEDEPLAR/UFMG – TD 438(2011) 
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ranges from as low as 8% of current wages in Canada to 35% in Italy, the ratio for Brazil is the second 
highest  (31%).  Public  expenditure  ratio  is  directly  affected  by  old-age  dependency,  benefit  ratio, 
employment and pensioner ratio. Brazil benefits from having a low ODR, but high levels of BR and 
PR, and low levels of ER drive public pension expenditure to the second highest level when compared 




Estimates of Public Pension Expenditures, Benefit Ratio, Old-Age Dependency Ratio, Pensioner Ratio, 
Employment Ratio and Pensioner per Worker Ratio (2000-2005) 
 
Country  PER  BR  ODR  PR  ER  PWR 
United Kingdon  0,08  0,20  0,24  1,19  0,73  0,44 
United States  0,08  0,31  0,19  1,10  0,76  0,27 
Canada  0,10  0,33  0,18  1,21  0,72  0,31 
Japan  0,14  0,36  0,25  1,16  0,74  0,39 
Germany  0,24  0,51  0,24  1,33  0,68  0,48 
France  0,29  0,58  0,24  1,25  0,61  0,50 
Italy  0,35  0,49  0,27  1,47  0,55  0,71 
Brazil  0,31  0,70  0,09  1,67  0,34  0,44 
Source: Bongaarts (2004) for OECD coutries. Author´s calculations for Brazil 
 
 
5.1.2. Estimating the Baseline Scenario 
 
  The baseline scenario does not aim to provide with the expected trend in the public pension 
measures for Brazil between 2005 and 2050. The idea is to have a simple  model to compare and 
contrast to other scenarios that will be discussed in the following section.  
  The baseline scenario assumes that main drive of changes in public pension measures is the 
demographic forecast. The paper uses the IBGE 2008 population projection to construct this scenario. 
IBGE assumes that mortality will continue to decline, increasing life expectancy, fertility will decline 
and  then  stabilize  at  1.8  children  per  woman.  The  population age structure in  2050  will  be  very 
different from what is observed today, old-age dependency ratio will reach 0.38. This level is very 
closed to what is projected to the US and Canada in 2050 (United Nations). 
  All other variables in the baseline scenario assume that age and sex profiles of employment 
will remain at the levels observed in 2005. The changes observed in ER are due to changes in the age 
composition of the population in the labor force. The baseline scenario does not include changes in the 
female labor force participation rates or improvements in the contribution rates. The same goes for PR, 
constant age profiles, assuming that the age of retirement will not change from 2005 to 2050 or any 
major  change  in  social  security  legislation. All  changes  in  PR  are  only  due  to  population  aging. 
Finally, it is assumed that Benefit Ratio (BR) remains constant at the levels observed in 2005 for 
Brazil. That is, the estimates assume that benefits will increase at the same rate as wages, or in other 
words the indexation scheme will be the rate of variation in real wages. It is assumed that this is a 
reasonable assumption because the main interest is to investigate how population changes affect the 
sustainability of the Brazilian public pension system.  
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The baseline projection shows the impacts of demographic changes to the level of expenditure 
as  it  maintains  employment and  retirement  profiles  fixed  at  current  level.   The  scenario  does not 
incorporate  any  feed-back  effects  or  policy  changes  proposed  by  the  government.  This  analysis  
provides empirical evidence to support the thesis that the absence of appropriate policies can mitigate 
temporary benefits of population changes, and aggravate adverse effects of population aging in Brazil; 
besides of providing us with a benchmark scenario.   
  Figure 6 shows the baseline projections of the pensioner per worker ratio (PWR). The number 
of pensioners per worker rises substantially with time, as it would be expected by the rapid process of 
population aging in Brazil (shown by the rise in old-age dependency ratio). In 2050, PWR is projected 
to  reach  1.23,  that  is,  123 pensioners  per  100 workers.  The  trend  in  Brazil  is  similar  to  what  is 
projected for Italy where PWR is projected to be 1.55 in 2050. PWR in Brazil is project to be the 
second highest among the countries analyzed here (based on Bongaarts estimates). For instance, the 



















Public Pension Expenditure in relation to current labor income (earnings) is shown in Figure 
7. As Bongaarts (2004) show, PER is proportional to the trend in PWR. Public expenditure in Brazil, 
in  relation  to  labor  earnings,  rise  rapidly  because  of  demographic  transition.  The  expenditure  is 
projected to grow from 31% of labor earnings in 2005 to 86% in 2050. The estimated expenditure in 
Brazil is larger than what is projected for all G-7 economies. In Italy, where is observed the largest 
increase, the ratio is forecasted to rise from 35% in 2000 to 75% in 2050. In the US the expenditure 
ratio will almost double, from 8% to 14%. There trends indicate that current regulations of the public 
pension system in Brazil is unsustainable over the long term. The system will benefit a little from the 
demographic transition, from 2005 to 2020, when rates of population in working-age groups will grow 
faster than old-age individuals leading to a slower growth in the expenditure ratios. But, when this 
bonus period is over, ratios are projected to increase at a much faster pace (Queiroz, Turra & Perez, Population Aging and the Rising Costs of Public Pension in Brazil – CEDEPLAR/UFMG – TD 438(2011) 
18 
2008; Turra & Queiroz, 2009). . In other words, Brazil is going to the period of demographic bonus (or 
demographic dividend), that is, a period in which working age population grows faster than the youth 
and old-age population. This population scenario creates the possibility of greater economic growth, 
greater  investments  in  education  and  possible  reforms  to  the  pension  system.  Unfortunately,  this 
change in population age structure is temporary, Brazilian population is aging fast, and the window for 


















5.2. Simulating Alternative Scenarios  
   
In Section 2 it was presented the evolution of public pension regulations in Brazil and, briefly, 
discussed proposed changes in the system. Population aging and rising costs of public pensions can act 
as  a  burden  to  economic  development  and  reduce  investments  in  other  social  areas,  especially 
investments in education and health. This paper now simulates some parametric changes, that is, we 
maintain the basic structure of the system. The proposed reforms (or changes are):  
 
a)  Increase labor force participation and percentage of individuals paying social security taxes, and 
consequently the retirement rates. Employment Ratio for females is much lower than for males. 
We do a simulation by equalizing female employment ratio to the male employment ratio observed 
in 2005. The employment ratio for males is about 0.50 whereas for females is below 0.30. We 
simulate changes with ER = 0.50. It is show how these changes have different impacts over time, 
in the short-term it benefits the system, and later on it imposes more costs to the system; 
b)  Delay retirement by disconsidering length of contribution retirement benefits. In this exercise we 
assume that individuals can only retirement by age (65 for males and 60 for females); 
c)  Reduce public pension benefits: instead of the observed 70% replacement ratio observed in Brazil, 
we reduce the benefit ratio to 50% as observed in Germany and Italy.  Population Aging and the Rising Costs of Public Pension in Brazil – CEDEPLAR/UFMG – TD 438(2011) 
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d)  Increase labor force participation for females, equalizing it to the male labor force participation 
observed in 2005 (see item a), the age profile to workers making contribution to the system – 
which affects the probabilities of retirement, and delay retirement; 
e)  perform all changes (a, b and c) at the same time.  
  
 
 FIGURE 8 
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Figure 8 show the simulation exercises to PWR in Brazil. As shown before, a large proportion 
of workers do not contribute to the public pension system. Any rise in formal employment would have 
a significant effect on the relation between pensioners and workers in the next few decades. In 2050, 
we estimated for the baseline scenario a PWR of 1.23, by increasing the current number of employees 
in the formal sector to the male levels observed in 2050 (around 50%) the ratio declines to 1.02. This 
effect reduce the PWR in 11%.  The simulation exercise incorporates changes in the probability of 
retirement. In the short-run, there are more people paying social security taxes (one of the changes 
proposed) and reduces the indicator compared to the baseline. In the long-term, the current working 
age individuals will retire, but since population is changing (young cohorts are smaller) there will be 
more people receiving benefits than the baseline model.   
  The literature review and preliminary data analysis showed that retirement ages in Brazil are 
relatively low compared to other developed and developing countries (Queiroz, 2008). We simulate an 
increase  in  retirement age  by  eliminating length of  contribution  retirement  benefits.  In 2050,  this 
change in retirement patterns would reduce PRW by 10% compared to the baseline scenario. The final 
exercise simulates at the same time an increase in contribution rates, delay in retirement and reduction 
of the pension benefit replacement rate. The final scenario implies in a reduction of PWR by 20% 
compared to the baseline scenario.   
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Finally, we focus on the Public Pension Expenditure (PER), future trends are shown in Figure 
9. PER gives a measure of public expenditures in social security. As discussed elsewhere (Caetano, 
2007), social security expenditures in Brazil are one of the largest in the world. The measure relates 
expenditures  to  current  wage  levels  (labor  earnings).  The  baseline  scenario  shows  that  in  2050, 
expenditures would reach 86% of labor income. It should be stressed that we simulate this situation by 
keeping current conditions fixed and assuming that pension benefits will increase at the same rate as 
labor income. A change in employment ratio and postponing retirement would reduce PER by 46% in 
2050. Even with policy makers decide not to alter benefit replace rates, but increase contribution rates 
and put policies in place that delay retirement, PER would reduce significantly. A change in the labor 
force  profile  (contribution  and  retirement)  would  reduce  PER  by  25%  in  2050  compared  to  the 
baseline scenario (0.86 to 0.64).  
 
 
FIGURE  9 
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The raise in the number of workers paying social security taxes in scenarios A, D and E imply 
in an increase in the number of beneficiaries in the future. The reduction in the PWR, in relation to the 
baseline scenario (Figure 10) is not constant overtime. In relation to scenario A, change in ER, it is 
observed that  the rate  of reduction  increases  in  the  short-term,  when  there is  only  an increase  in 
retirement by disability and survivors benefits, but decreases faster after 2020 when new retirees reach 
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FIGURE 10 
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Retirement is an important stage on one’s life cycle. Contrary to the past, most workers today 
enjoy a long and healthy period of retirement. In Brazil, the expansion of the social security system, 
economic development and rising income have allowed more workers to leave the labor market. In 
addition, improvements in goods and services provided to the elderly have transformed retirement into 
a more pleasurable and desirable stage of life. What will happen in the future? Is Brazil ready to 
support a large population of retirees?  
  The rapid process of population aging  will have huge impacts on the sustainability  of the 
Brazilian pension system. The increase in the old age dependency ratio means a larger number of 
beneficiaries will depend on a smaller number of workers. The demographic problem is not the sole 
issue in this matter. There is also a strong downward trend in labor force participation at older ages. 
Early retirement has increased the dependency ratio more than would be predicted by demographic 
analysis  (Turra  &  Queiroz,  2009).  Labor  force  participation  rates  of  older  men  fell  significantly 
between 1950 and 2000.  During this time, the Brazilian social security system expanded, absorbing a 
larger group of the population and helping to accelerate the trends toward early retirement. Social 
security  regulations  in  Brazil,  like  in  many  other  countries,  provide  incentives  for  the  working 
population to postpone retirement until the age at which benefits are available. This occurs at age 65 in 
some cases but is sometimes at earlier ages, such as 55, due to the existence of benefits based on 
length of service.  
  The rapid population aging, size and  fiscal problems of pension systems in the  developed 
world led researchers to devote considerable attention to this problem in those countries. However, 
developing countries are aging more rapidly than developed countries, and social welfare programs 
will be asked to provide more support than they might be able to give. It is generally assumed that the 
Brazilian pension system is not generous and only pays small benefits. Another common idea is that Population Aging and the Rising Costs of Public Pension in Brazil – CEDEPLAR/UFMG – TD 438(2011) 
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low  life  expectancy  at  birth  justifies  early  retirement  ages,  and  by  the  fact  that  individuals  have 
worked  enough. This papers shows that this popular perception  overlooks the role  of the security 
system  in  shaping the  evolution  of  retirement  behavior  in  Brazil,  how  duration  of retirement  has 
increased in recent years, and the degree of generosity of the program, especially for some sub-groups 
of the population.  
  The paper has two important findings that support previous evidence. First, the effects of age 
structure on the pace of population ageing (i.e. population momentum) have provided extra time for 
social security; about 25 years until pensioner per worker ratio and public pension expenditure reach 
levels that will be unsustainable to the system and to the  economy.  Second, simulation exercises 
indicate that  increasing  retirement  age  and  increasing number  of individuals  making  contributions 
(investiments  in  the  formal  sector)  could  reduce  the  impact  of  population  aging,  help  honour 
obligations, and create future conditions for economic growth. 
  Brazil is facing a problem similar to that of developed nations. With population aging, these 
countries are looking for ways to increase the average retirement age and minimize the impact of 
population  aging  on  the  public  sector.  The  empirical  evidence  presented  before  points  to  the 
importance of establishing a minimum retirement age, providing actuarially fair benefits for those who 
remain in the labor force beyond the minimum retirement age, and creating incentives to bring in to 
the system workers in the informal sector who do not contribute but can still be eligible for benefits.   
  In  recent  months,  the  government  was  discussing  the  possibility  of  ending  the  Fator 
Previdenciario. The  Fator  creates  incentives  for  older  workers  to  stay  in  the  labor  force  since  it 
increases the possible benefit one can receive as they work longer. The Fator improved the conditions 
of the social security system in Brazil. In any case, as population ages and individuals live longer, 
establishing a minimum retirement age and ending length of contribution retirement benefit is one of 
the most important changes in the Brazilian public pension system. However, such policies (increasing 
labor  supply)  should  also  consider  labor  demand  impacts.  There  are  not  much  research  on  age 
discrimination in the Brazilian labor market. If the social security rules creates incentives for workers 
to remain in the labor force, one does not know whether companies will hire or not those workers. It is 
also important to consider changes in the labor market regulations in order to increase the number of 
contributors to the pension system. More important, reform should be started as soon as possible when 
the country is going thru the demographic dividend period.  
  The importance of the public pension systems throughout the world is unquestionable, and the 
well-being of the elderly depends heavily on the provision of income from such programs. However, 
the necessity to reform the Brazilian pension system is clear. The main question is how the reform 
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